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An Expense out of Control:
Rule 33 Interrogatories After the Advent of
Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals for
Change
Amy Luria & John E. Clabby
Interrogatories exchanged under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 33 drain litigation resources while providing few
concomitant benefits to litigants. Despite this problem, there is no
recent scholarly literature suggesting reform to this device. Other
discovery devices, including initial disclosures and requests for
admission, better serve parties as relatively fast and cheap
exchanges of information in advance of trial.
This Essay
describes the wastes and benefits of Rule 33 interrogatories as
parties use them in practice today. Then, this Essay makes and
evaluates two proposals for change. In the first proposal, the
Essay suggests creating mandatory, uniform interrogatories keyed
to substantive areas of law, following a model that several states
have already incorporated into their civil rules. In the second and
alternative proposal, this Essay proposes eliminating Rule 33
interrogatories altogether, because most of the work that the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules first intended interrogatories
to do is now better accomplished through other discovery devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In practice, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33
interrogatories exchange little substantive information between
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parties. Sending interrogatories costs a litigant more than that
party earns in information.
Often, filing interrogatories
generates nothing but unresponsive, by-the-book objections or
otherwise evasive answers from an opponent.1 The norms of
practice encourage a lawyer to file interrogatories, even though
the answers to those interrogatories would not help that lawyer’s
client.2
Interrogatories are the most abused discovery vehicle, and
what is more problematic is that their cost generates little value.3
Attorneys ask questions drawn from a stock reserve and those
questions return only objections, vague answers, and very little
information.4 This is due in part to the ease with which one can
generate interrogatories, as well as “the proliferation of machineAs a result, interrogatories are often
stored questions.”5
“frustrating, costly, and ineffective for both parties.”6 The
standard objections of “overly broad,” “vague,” and “unduly
burdensome” provide no substantive content to the sender of the
interrogatories.7 Compounding the problem, adversaries and the
courts are normally reluctant to condemn the liberal objector.8
Courts want to stay out of discovery disputes except in the worst
cases, and adversaries themselves are playing similar games
with their own objections.

1 See ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 364-65
(4th ed. 2000) (discussing the “limitations, weaknesses, and risks” of using interrogatories
and warning against attorneys who abuse the system).
2 See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF
COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 13 tbl.2 (1997) (reporting one survey of
attorneys in federal court showing that in cases involving some discovery, 81% of
attorneys used interrogatories).
3 C. Lynn Oliver, Note, Economical Litigation: Kentucky’s Answer to High Costs and
Delay in Civil Litigation, 71 KY. L.J. 647, 659 (1983) (citing Weyman I. Lundquist, In
Search of Discovery Reform, 66 A.B.A. J. 1071, 1072 (1980)).
4 See FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: COMBATING STONEWALLING
AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES 83-88 (2d prtg. 1995) (describing common tactics for
evading disclosure under interrogatories, and under other discovery requests, such as
boilerplate objections, use of semantics, unilaterally limiting the scope of relevance, and
misleading responses).
5 Oliver, supra note 3, at 659.
6 U.S. Army Legal Servs., USALSA Report: Litigation Division Note, 1997 ARMY
LAW. 38, 38 (Aug. 1997).
7 HARE, supra note 4, at 83-84.
8 Haydock and his co-authors discuss the “Nightmare” test as a guide for when to
know, as a lawyer, if your response to an interrogatory fails Rule 33’s reasonableness
standard. HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 394 (“Pretend that the opposing attorney has
brought a Rule 37 motion before a judge whom you have recently skunked in racquetball
and that the judge asks you, ‘How in the discovery world can you justify your response?’
If you defend with a winning retort, your interrogatory response is reasonable. If you
wake up in a sweat, you need to redraft your response.”).
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Put broadly, the problem with interrogatories is that lawyers
believe, and the system reinforces, that the exchange and answer
of interrogatories is a game.9 That a lawyer expects an objection
causes the sender to wrangle over the form of a question and to
hesitate over the proper term with which to define a thought.10
Historically, “practitioners have used interrogatories as a
litigation tactic to harass and to overwhelm an opponent or to
delay the resolution of a dispute.”11 In return, an entire body of
literature explains how to avoid giving thorough and responsive
answers to interrogatories.12
At base, the problem with interrogatories is lawyer conduct.
Lawyers must somehow be held accountable for their zealous but
inefficient use of the device. Burdensome, overreaching, and
frivolous questions — and boilerplate, bad-faith objections in
return — cause delay instead of enlightenment.
Any
consideration of how to reform the interrogatory device must
acknowledge the lack of incentives for lawyers to exchange and to
request information from one another in good faith.
While some critics suggest that only severe sanctions for this
stonewalling can prevent such discovery evasion,13 the structure
of the rules and cooperative norms also play important roles.
Reforming the structure of the interrogatory device, or isolating
what is good about the device and transferring that to other
devices more easily monitored, might structurally solve a
problem without harsher sanctions or greater judicial
involvement. Any change must attempt to decrease the role of
9 When one party has deviated from fair play into the strategic world of objections,
tit-for-tat will govern. HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 387 (“Strategically speaking,
objections to borderline interrogatories may also cause the other side to object to
borderline interrogatories you submit to them.”).
10 Ronald J. Schutz & Darren B. Schwiebert, Interrogatories, in PATENT LITIGATION
STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 135, 139 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 2000)
(advising a patent litigant that “the specific wording of a well-drafted interrogatory
should be strategically calculated to elicit the information useful to your position”).
11 U.S. Army Legal Servs., supra note 6, at 38.
12 E.g., LAWRENCE A. MORSE, OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES § 1250 (Joan Manno
ed., 1990) (explaining several different types of objections that one can use in “avoiding or
limiting” responses to interrogatories); see also United States Army Legal Services, supra
note 6, at 40 (“The simple goal of Rule 33 is to ensure that a party answers the relevant
questions of an opposing party. That is not to say that a party must divulge all
information in his possession to the opposing party. Answers to interrogatories should be
responsive, accurate, and complete, but they should be made with the understanding that
they will be used against the responding party. Consequently, interrogatories should be
approached with a defensive frame of mind. Words should be chosen carefully, with an
eye toward their use at trial.”).
13 HARE ET AL., supra note 4, at 79 (arguing for “severe sanctions” to deter
stonewalling in interrogatories and in other discovery devices, a problem that is now in
“epidemic proportions” due to the economic incentives of corporate parties to a litigation).

LURIA___CLABBY_FINAL SENT TO COPY

32

Chapman Law Review

12/14/2005 5:12 PM

[Vol. 9:29

gamesmanship and to increase the profitable exchange of pretrial
information between the parties to a lawsuit. Any change should
also seek to minimize judicial involvement and help to limit the
cost to the litigants of pretrial exchanges of questions while
maximizing their value.
With these ends in mind, any
amendment to Rule 33 should weigh the benefits of retaining the
interrogatory device against its expense and efficiency in fairly
exposing valuable information between adversaries.
Scholars have failed to address the root cause of the
inefficiency of interrogatories.
Practitioners have written
volumes on how to “game” the interrogatory system. And many
states have started to amend their rules of civil procedure to
address this gaming, including experimenting with ideas such as
uniform interrogatories. Yet, despite the prominence of the
problem, scholars have failed to suggest reforming this device.
This Essay seeks to explore the problem, and makes two
proposals for change. Part I explores what is useful about
interrogatories, both as the device is conceived in theory and as
the device is used in practice (where the benefits are much
narrower) and should therefore be preserved. Specifically, one
finds that interrogatories are useful in three areas: discovery of
contentions, discovery of technical or statistical data, and
discovery of knowledgeable persons. Such findings are important
in evaluating the two proposals for change that follow, as we are
then aware of what may be lost through amendment or
elimination of Rule 33 interrogatories. The findings of Part I also
allow us to evaluate how successful other discovery devices will
be at replacing the work that interrogatories are intended to
accomplish.
In Part II of the Essay, we describe and evaluate two
proposals for change to the interrogatory device that we believe
will decrease the role of gamesmanship and increase the
profitable exchange of pretrial information between the parties to
a lawsuit. The first proposal seeks a rehabilitation of Rule 33 to
preserve what was intended as a meaningful pretrial exchange of
information between parties.
Proposal I suggests limiting
interrogatories to certain standardized interrogatories, perhaps
organized by substantive areas of the law, to which parties would
be unable to object on grounds other than those of privilege.
These
form
interrogatories
would
include
contention
interrogatories, technical or statistical data interrogatories, and
knowledgeable person interrogatories. Failure to answer these
interrogatories would result in sanctions.
In forming and
evaluating this proposal, we rely on the rules of civil procedure of
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a few states that have mandatory interrogatories, uniform
interrogatories, and both.
The second proposal is more dramatic: the elimination of
Rule 33 interrogatories altogether. The current Federal Rules,
which already require certain initial disclosures under Rule
26(a), might benefit from the elimination of the Rule 33 device
and a concomitant editing of other rules – pertaining to requests
for admissions, initial disclosures, and pretrial discovery
conferencing – to retain much of the best features of
interrogatories. In analyzing this proposal, we discuss how other
discovery devices, mainly initial disclosures under Rule 26 and
requests for admission under Rule 36, are being used by parties
today to perform the issue-narrowing functions that
interrogatories were intended to perform.
Finally, we conclude with a summary of our findings and a
suggestion to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
(Committee) for how it might combine the two proposals. The
federal discovery rules, including Rule 33, were intended to aid in
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action,”14 and the reformation or elimination of Rule 33
interrogatories might rehabilitate what is good about the
historically “most abused discovery mechanism.”15
II. FOR WHAT PURPOSES ARE INTERROGATORIES USEFUL?
Interrogatories are supposed to be cheap, fast, and binding
on a party. “In theory, there could not be a simpler, more
efficient, and less expensive discovery method than sending
written questions to the opposing party and having him send
back the sworn written answers.”16 Therefore, the current form
of interrogatories helps lawyers when used efficiently.17
However, when attorneys spin their wheels to draft
unobjectionable questions, and their adversary attorneys retort
by spinning their wheels to craft objections, seldom does
information change hands. Any cost, then, to a useless device is
too high a cost.

14 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 official cmt; see Meade W. Mitchell, Comment, Discovery Abuse
and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory Disclosure, 62 MISS. L.J. 743, 764 (1993). “The
speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil procedures was recognized as the most
important mandate of the rules, embodying the very ‘spirit of the rules.’” Mitchell, supra,
at 744 n.7.
15 Oliver, supra note 3, at 659 (citing Lundquist, supra note 3, at 1072).
16 United States Army Legal Servs., supra note 6, at 38.
17 See generally HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (listing the advantages of
interrogatories over other forms of discovery).
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But interrogatories, in theory, should lead to the inexpensive
exchange of information between the parties. An exchange of
information early in litigation should lead to a faster resolution
of the dispute and might even encourage settlement.18
Substantive answers to interrogatories should also lead to more
targeted discovery requests, which in turn might lead to a faster
resolution of the dispute. If the device worked more efficiently,
then it should help decrease the cost of litigation and increase its
speed.
The question then becomes what about interrogatories is
useful and should therefore be preserved. Interrogatories serve a
useful function in three areas: “discovery of contentions,
discovery of technical or statistical data, and discovery of
knowledgeable persons.”19 At base, interrogatories are useful for
the discovery of contentions and the discovery of certain fact lists.
For these areas, “there probably is no better way to get
information.”20
Contention interrogatories are inquiries that require the
identification of positions on issues in the case.21 Contention
interrogatories “seek to clarify the basis for or scope of an
adversary’s legal claims. The general view is that contention
interrogatories are a perfectly permissible form of discovery, to
which a response ordinarily would be required.”22 An example of
a contention interrogatory is: “Do you contend that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent regarding the accident on August 6,
1998?”23
The contention interrogatory is valuable for a few reasons.
First, it forces the adversary to reveal her basis for positions
18 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (The interrogatory device “reveals
information that will put the parties in realistic and informed positions from which to
negotiate a settlement or stipulate to agreed facts.”).
19 Kenneth R. Berman, Q: Is This Any Way to Write an Interrogatory? A: You Bet It
Is, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL PRETRIAL 154, 155 (John G. Koeltl & John Kiernan eds.,
3rd ed. 1999) (discussing when interrogatories serve a useful and sometimes critical
function). This paper relies on Berman’s framework for when interrogatories are useful.
20 Id. at 155.
21 Rule 33(c) specifically allows these types of interrogatories: “An interrogatory
otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the
interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of
law to fact . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c).
22 Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., 144 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Taylor
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a
complaint is vague and conclusory, a defendant should not move for dismissal, but rather
should serve contention interrogatories); Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab Ltd., 99 F.3d 217, 222
(7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that if a defendant wishes to minimize uncertainty concerning
the scope of a plaintiff’s claim, the defendant could serve contention interrogatories).
23 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 370.
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taken in the pleadings.24 Second, it is generally immune from
evasion because the responding party cannot claim ignorance of
the answer when the question is based on the responding party’s
claims.25 In fact, if in a negligence case, one’s adversary
responds, “I do not know at this time,” she is “invit[ing] a motion
for summary judgment or a motion to strike under Rule 11.”26
Third, contention interrogatories are often “invaluable in
narrowing the issues, laying foundations for motions, and
preparing a thorough trial defense.”27
In addition, interrogatories target technical and statistical
data better than do other forms of discovery, in part because
depositions and document requests cannot readily expose this
information.28 Technical and statistical interrogatories force
opposing counsel to ask the client to prepare the answer, as it is
unlikely that the attorney will have all of the necessary
information at his or her fingertips.29 Moreover, the only evasion
of such an interrogatory appears to be limited to Rule 33(d),
which allows one to avoid answering when the answer may be
derived from reviewing business records, and when the burden of
deriving such information is the same for both the questioner and
the answerer.30
The final area in which interrogatories are useful is in the
discovery of knowledgeable persons.31 An example of such an
interrogatory reads: “Please state the name and address of each
24 See Berman, supra note 19, at 156 (explaining why contention interrogatories are
valuable); HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 367 (explaining that interrogatories are
useful for explaining pleading allegations in specific detail).
25 Berman, supra note 19, at 156.
26 Berman, supra note 19, at 156 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note
to 1993 Amendment).
27 U.S. Army Legal Servs., supra note 6, at 39.
28 See Berman, supra note 19, at 160 (explaining why interrogatories seeking
technical or statistical data are useful); see also HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 368
(finding that interrogatories may pursue “[s]ummary explanations of technical data and
statistics, manuals, reports, studies, and materials containing technical information”).
29 Berman, supra note 19, at 161.
30 Berman, supra note 19, at 161 (“The answerer is more familiar with the
documents that contain the information; she will know the meaning of special codes or
abbreviations in the documents; and she will know how to use the documents to obtain
the answer.”).
31 It is important to note that asking about “knowledgeable persons” through
interrogatories is still helpful even after the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure added initial disclosures. Although under Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A), “a
party must automatically disclose the identity of persons likely to have information
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,” the term “alleged
with particularity” is not always clear, and as such, an adversary who concludes that the
complaint alleges facts without particularity may not disclose the names of important
witnesses in a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) initial disclosure. Berman, supra note 19, at 162-63 (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 Amendment).
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person who has knowledge of a particular subject matter.” One
would think that the following two objections to such an
interrogatory would be quite common: (1) the interrogatory is
overbroad; and (2) the attorney cannot speculate as to the
knowledge. However, Rule 26 appears to preclude the latter
objection because it assumes that a party answering will in good
faith disclose the persons the respondent knows or ought to know
has facts relevant to the particular subject matter.32 However, it
appears likely that there will always be an “overbroad” objection.
Despite the possible “overbroad” objection to the
interrogatory, this particular type of interrogatory adds value to
the propounding party’s case when it is answered. First, “the
answer will be the next best thing to the adversary’s witness
list.”33 Second, “the answer will guide [one] in framing a
deposition program” in that it may help narrow “the cast of
characters.”34 Lastly, the answers to these interrogatories “will
make document production more meaningful” in that the
answers will help an attorney request documents by reference to
named individuals, as well as alert him or her to names to search
for in the produced documents.35
Essentially, interrogatories work when lawyers ask for
specific lists, such as everyone in a company who has information
about X.36 What this all means is that contention interrogatories
and those interrogatories that seek “lists” as answers are
generally the most useful in discovering necessary information.
As such, the usefulness of these types of interrogatories must be
retained when crafting any type of rule to increase the
effectiveness of the discovery process.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Proposal I: Create Standardized Interrogatories Based on

32 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (discussing the possible objections to
knowledgeable person interrogatories).
33 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (citing Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts & Serv., Inc., 864
F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1988)). The majority rule in the federal courts is that witness
lists are not discoverable through interrogatories. HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 36970; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A) (requiring pretrial disclosure of a witness list).
34 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (citing Eppler v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 860 F. Supp.
1391, 1396 (W.D. Mo. 1994)).
35 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (explaining the benefits of knowledgeable person
interrogatories); see HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (discussing how interrogatories
can help target people and topics for later discovery).
36 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 367 (“Categories of information that
interrogatories do disclose in an effective and economical way include specific, objective
types of information.”).
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Subject Matter
The first proposal would amend Rule 33 to require answers
to certain standardized interrogatories. These non-objectionable
interrogatories would be categorized according to substantive
areas of the law, such as antitrust or patent cases. This proposal
addresses the gamesmanship of the current interrogatory
practice by stamping certain questions as non-objectionable.
This amendment to Rule 33 would sacrifice the current
breadth of interrogatories in favor of requiring answers to certain
interrogatories. The proposal would add several forms to Rule
33, each designed with a specific practice area in mind. These
forms would list a handful of interrogatory questions to which
objections would be impossible. A party would face sanctions
immediately upon failure to answer these questions.
This proposal suggests that the 1993 amendments to Rule
33, limiting the number of interrogatories that each party may
file, changed the strategic use of interrogatories, but did not
eliminate the game playing. That is, historically, parties abused
the device by burying an opponent in interrogatories; but today,
parties carefully craft the few interrogatories they send and
spend an equal time crafting objections.37 So while the 1993
amendments to Rule 33 addressed both overuse and
stonewalling, overuse is more easily detected and solved than is
Prior to the 1993 amendments, many
stonewalling.38
commentators cited interrogatories as the most abused form of
discovery.39 Because the 1993 amendments did little to address
abuse, interrogatories remain a serious drain on client resources
with little return on value. Eliminating the possibility for
objection, at least for a few categories of substantive law, would
eliminate the objection game-playing altogether.
1. Uniform Interrogatories in the State Courts
Included in these standardized interrogatories might be
contention interrogatories, technical or statistical interrogatories,
Because these
and knowledgeable person interrogatories.40
37 Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 135-37 (reporting how the amendments to
Rule 33 in 1993 changed the strategic use of interrogatories from a paper-dump problem
to a wordsmithing problem); see also Oliver, supra note 3, at 659 (describing one problem
of interrogatories as “overuse” and another as “abuse”).
38 HARE ET AL., supra note 4, at 66, 79.
39 E.g., Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 135 (citing JOHN J. COUND ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE—CASES AND MATERIALS 743 (5th ed. 1989)).
40 See supra Part I. INTRODUCTION (explaining how these three types of questions
are the most useful and fair interrogatories).
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interrogatories would be tailored to specific practice areas – the
interrogatories for an antitrust suit would differ from the
interrogatories for an employment discrimination suit – the
adoption of the forms would be highly politicized. However,
several states have in fact adopted uniform interrogatories,41 and
these proposals operate in the states with some success.42 In
writing the federal forms, the Committee should borrow the
design of those states that have adopted uniform interrogatories,
triggered by certain substantive claims.
For example, Connecticut limits the interrogatories one can
use in personal injury actions arising from the operation or
ownership of a motor vehicle, or the ownership, maintenance, or
control of real property, to those interrogatories set forth in
specified forms.43 As such, it appears that if a party wishes to
serve interrogatories, she can only use the interrogatories set
forth in the forms. However, if a party does not wish to serve
certain interrogatories listed on the forms, or does not wish to
serve any interrogatories, she is not required to do so.
In contrast, in New Jersey, personal injury claims have
mandatory uniform interrogatories.44 These interrogatories are
mandatory in that upon service of the complaint and defendant’s
answer to the complaint, the uniform interrogatories are deemed
automatically served; both sides must serve the uniform
interrogatories.45 Moreover, the responding party must answer
41 See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1 (explaining the rules pertaining to uniform
interrogatories in certain actions); CONN. R. CT. § 13-6 (discussing the rules pertaining to
interrogatories); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1 (explaining the rules regarding uniform and nonuniform interrogatories).
42 This proposal would benefit greatly from such empirical data as that gathered
prior to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’ changes to Rule 33 in 1993. See JOHN
SHAPARD & CARROLL SERON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEYS’ VIEWS OF LOCAL RULES
LIMITING INTERROGATORIES (1986) as an example of a study that polled attorneys on how
state changes to the interrogatory device helped and hurt those attorneys in practice.
43 CONN. R. CT. § 13-6(b) (“In all personal injury actions alleging liability based on
the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle or alleging liability based on the ownership,
maintenance or control of real property, the interrogatories served shall be limited to
those set forth in Forms 201, 202 and/or 203 of the rules of practice, unless upon motion,
the judicial authority determines that such interrogatories are inappropriate or
inadequate in the particular action.”).
44 See N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b) (discussing when uniform interrogatories are mandatory).
45 The relevant section of N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(2) reads: “A party defendant served
with a complaint in an action subject to uniform interrogatories as prescribed by
subparagraph b(1) of this rule shall be deemed to have been simultaneously served with
such interrogatories. The defendant shall serve answers to the appropriate uniform
interrogatories within 60 days after service by that defendant of the answer to the
complaint. The plaintiff in such an action shall be deemed to have been served with
uniform interrogatories simultaneously with service of defendant’s answer to the
complaint and shall serve answers to the interrogatories within 30 days after service of
the answer to the complaint.”
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the uniform interrogatories within a specified number of days.46
New Jersey Rule of Court 4:17-1(b), sets out when a party
must use uniform interrogatories.
In all actions seeking recovery for property damage to automobiles
and in all personal injury cases other than wrongful death, toxic torts,
cases involving issues of professional malpractice other than medical
malpractice, and those products liability cases either involving
pharmaceuticals or giving rise to a toxic tort claim, the parties shall
be limited to the interrogatories prescribed by Forms A, B, and C of
Appendix II, as appropriate . . . .47

New Jersey does allow each party to propound ten additional
Any additional
questions without leave of court.48
interrogatories, however, shall be permitted only with the court’s
permission.49
New Jersey and Connecticut are not alone in their creation
of uniform interrogatories. There is “[a]n accelerating trend in
state civil procedure rules” toward the use of court-created rather
For example, California
than lawyer-initiated discovery.50
provides uniform interrogatories merely as a guide, allowing for
other interrogatories and permitting the responding party its full
catalog of objections.51

46 N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(2); N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(4) (“Except as otherwise provided in
subparagraph (b)(3) of this rule, every question propounded by a uniform interrogatory
must be answered unless the court has otherwise ordered.”). As such, the only valid
objections to these uniform interrogatories are claims of privilege and claims that the
information sought “is the subject of an identified protective order issued pursuant to R.
4:10-3.” N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(3). Examples of some of the uniform interrogatories
provided in Appendix II of Rule 4:17-1 are as follows:
1. State: (a) the full name and residence address of each defendant; (b) if a
corporation, the exact corporate name; and (c) if a partnership, the exact
partnership name and the full name and residence address of each partner.

...
3. If you intend to set up or plead or have set up or pleaded negligence or any
other separate defense as to the plaintiff or if you have or intend to set up a
counterclaim or third-party action, (a) state the facts upon which you intend to
predicate such defenses, counterclaim or third-party action; and (b) identify a
copy of every document relating to such facts.
N.J. CT. R.4:17-1, app. II.
47 N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(1) (emphasis added).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the
Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 616-17 (2002) (discussing the
implementation of uniform interrogatories in certain states).
51 See, e.g., Judicial Council of California, Form Interrogatories–Employment Law
(2002), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/laborlaw/2002-forminterrogatories.pdf.
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Arizona also has uniform interrogatories, for specific causes
of action, which serve as a guide.52 “In Arizona, there are twentytwo standard uniform interrogatories for personal injury actions
and twenty-three standard uniform interrogatories for contract
actions.”53 Although in Arizona an attorney does not have to use
these uniform interrogatories, Arizona’s Special Bar Committee
to Study Civil Litigation Abuses proposed the creation of uniform
interrogatories to address the same problems presently facing
the federal system — namely discovery abuse that leads to
The Arizona Supreme Court’s Comment in
inefficiency.54
accepting Rule 33.1 explained that the creation of uniform
interrogatories “was part of a comprehensive set of rule revisions
proposed by the Special Bar Committee to Study Civil Litigation
Abuse, Cost and Delay, which was specifically charged . . . with
the task of proposing rules to reduce discovery abuse and to make
the judicial system in Arizona more efficient, expeditious, and
accessible to the people.”55 As such, it appears that Arizona
attempted to address the problem of abuse, rather than overuse,
of its state’s interrogatories.
The state models will help the Committee navigate the
political waters of deciding which interrogatories in each
substantive area of the law to make non-objectionable, at least as
far as federal and state claims overlap.56
The state models will also help the Committee decide if the
federal uniform interrogatories (1) will be mandatory to ask; (2)
will be mandatory to answer; and (3) will be exclusive (the only
interrogatories a party may send). The answer to the first
question should be “no,” in order to preserve the traditional
optional nature of sending interrogatories. The answer to the
second question must be “yes,” in order to eliminate the game
playing in interrogatory battles, and because the questions have

52 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(f) (“The use of Uniform Interrogatories is not mandatory. The
interrogatories should serve as a guide only, and may or may not be approved as to either
form or substance in a particular case. They are not to be used as a standard set of
interrogatories for submission in all cases. Each interrogatory should be used only where
it fits the particular case.”).
53 Moskowitz, supra note 50, at 616.
54 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1 (Court Comment to the 1991 Amendment).
55 Id. (emphasis added).
56 Other sources from which the Committee might pull non-objectionable
interrogatories, more keyed to federal claims, are those handbooks that set forth
“boilerplate” interrogatories. In fact, lawyers who specialize in certain substantive areas
of the law already rely on form interrogatories. See, e.g., DOUGLAS DANNER & LARRY L.
VARN, PATTERN DISCOVERY: TORT ACTIONS (3d. ed. 2004). Such sources, though, do not
have the benefit of having passed through the deliberative process of a state government
and may favor one party unduly over another.

LURIA___CLABBY_FINAL SENT TO COPY

2005]

An Expense out of Control

12/14/2005 5:12 PM

41

already been screened so as to be non-objectionable.
Answering the third question is more challenging.
Amendments to Rule 33 should not permit the parties to set forth
any
additional
interrogatories
beyond
the
uniform
interrogatories provided for in the amended Rule 33, without
leave of court.
If Rule 33 allowed for such additional
interrogatories, the room for abuse by attorneys that currently
exists would remain. As such, Rule 33 should provide for
additional interrogatories only with leave of the court.
2. Possible Objections to the Proposal
The above discussion points to one specific problem with this
proposed model: from what sources should the Committee draw
non-objectionable interrogatories for each form? Two more
objections to uniform interrogatories at the federal level present
themselves. First, compound fields, such as environmental law,
may not be amenable to uniform interrogatories that are
mandatory to answer. Second, these forms breach the transsubstantivity to which the Rules aspire.
First, federal practice does not reduce itself to discrete areas
of the law. For example, in an environmental justice suit, claims
may include Equal Protection Clause violations, Fair Housing
Act violations, and private and public nuisance claims.57 At first
glance, perhaps Rule 33 uniform interrogatories should not be
created for these compound fields. However, in such a compound
claim, perhaps a litigant could trigger multiple forms depending
on the nature of the complaint. There is a more important
question, though, for the Committee to answer: what would
happen if a litigant triggered none of the forms? Would that
litigant be denied the interrogatory device, or would the forms
only modify Rule 33 when that substantive area of the law is part
of the complaint?
A preliminary answer denies any interrogatories in this case,
without leave of court. If the Committee has yet to approve
forms that capture the complaint, the parties will waste their
time, as under the current system, designing and evading crafted
interrogatories.
The Rule should deny the device in this
instance.
57 See generally S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D.N.J. 2003) (plaintiffs alleged that the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the NJDEP created both
public and private nuisances to the citizens of Camden by issuing a permit to an
industrial facility in Camden).
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Next, what interrogatories are available when the case
presents a complaint combining a claim that will trigger a form
with one that will not? One sensible answer would be to deny the
litigant the free choice of which interrogatories to send. This is
because a complaint containing one claim that would trigger a
form and one that would not fit under a form might otherwise
allow a litigant to sneak in interrogatories related to the formcontrolled claim by adding interrogatories related to the other
claim.
The second objection to this proposal is the lack of transsubstantivity created by dividing the forms based on the
substantive law raised in the complaint. At this time, it appears
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make few, if any,
distinctions based upon the area of law raised in the complaint.58
Many Federal Rules “make no policy choice[], . . .thereby
insulating the Rules from effective challenges under the statute
delegating rulemaking power to the Supreme Court . . . .”59
However, the Federal Rules “confer discretion on the trial
judge[s],” in actuality making Federal Rules “trans-substantive
only in the most trivial sense.”60
Some scholars contend that if rulemakers consider Rules
aimed at specific kinds of litigation, “the resulting rules would
favor the interests of those groups that were best able to
However, other
influence the rulemaking process.”61
commentators note that “maintaining a facial appearance of
trans-substantivity does not remove politics from the rulemaking
process.”62 Rather, considering substance-specific Rules allows
for closer consideration of the possible effects of the proposed
As such, substance-specific
Rule on interested groups.63
interrogatories are not inherently problematic.64
58 See Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1011 (2004) (discussing the transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1012; see Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1473 (1987) (book review) (surveying books discussing the law of complex litigation).
63 Struve, supra note 58, at 1012; see Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, supra note
62, at 1473 (discussing the impact of procedural and substantive rules); see also Stephen
P. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-18 (1988) (promoting the creation and use of
separate sets of procedural rules for different bodies of complex substantive law).
64 See Struve, supra note 58, at 1012.
However, it is important to note that
substance-specific rulemaking is complicated by the fact that under the Rules Enabling
Act, the Federal Rules must not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2003).
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Amending Rule 33 in this way would not solve all of the
problems associated with pretrial written exchanges between
parties, but this proposed amendment, which narrows the scope
of Rule 33 by requiring answers to approved questions based on
the substantive area of the law at issue, might add utility to the
device.
B. Proposal II: Eliminate Rule 33 Interrogatories
Perhaps the problems that interrogatories cause outweigh
the benefits. The adoption of required disclosures in Rule 26
ensures that information is actually exchanged between parties;
this is precisely what interrogatories were originally designed to
achieve.
Modifying the mandatory disclosure rule, and
encouraging the use of requests for admission, might replace the
bulk of the function of interrogatories. Considering the benefits
of interrogatories after taking into account other discovery
devices might tip the balance in favor of eliminating Rule 33
altogether.
Thus, any reform to the interrogatory device benefits from
viewing the device as useful only after the exhaustion of requests
for admissions, of initial disclosures, and of pretrial and
discovery conferencing.65 If what remains is too slight to justify
the expense of the device, or if amendments to the other devices
can reduce to nil what value remains in interrogatories, then the
device should be abolished.
1. Initial Disclosures
Much of the benefit that Rule 33 interrogatories traditionally
brought to litigation is now provided through other means.
Adding a certain provision to Rule 26(a) could preserve those
functions unique to Rule 33. If the Committee made these
changes, Rule 33 could be eliminated.
Mandatory initial disclosures were “designed to accelerate
the exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate
the paper work involved in requesting such information.”66 Rule
26 requires that each party within fourteen days after the Rule
26(f) conference disclose the identity of any person likely to have
65 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (suggesting that attorneys only use
interrogatories “when no other discovery request is available to produce the needed
information”); Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 137 (advising that attorneys not
“waste” their interrogatories searching for information that can be obtained through other
means).
66 Angela R. Lang, Note, Mandatory Disclosure Can Improve the Discovery System,
70 IND. L.J. 657, 657-58 (1995) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) Advisory Comm. Note).
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“discoverable information” about the case, disclose a copy or
description of relevant documents, disclose computations related
to any category of damages claimed, and disclose any insurance
agreement likely to be involved in the case.67
Despite debate regarding the effectiveness of mandatory
initial disclosures, an empirical study conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center found that “[i]nitial disclosure is being widely
used and is apparently working as intended, increasing fairness
and reducing costs and delays far more often than decreasing
fairness or increasing costs and delays.”68 As such, in contrast to
interrogatories, mandatory initial disclosures increase the
efficiency of litigation.
Initial disclosures answer basic questions of fact, and this
instrument eliminates much of the work for which parties had
“[T]he ‘court-ordered’
historically drafted interrogatories.69
interrogatories of Rule 26(a)(1) address one of the historical
functions of Rule 33 interrogatories — to explore broadly the
source of evidence available to the opposing party by obtaining
the identity of witnesses and the existence of documents.”70
Rule 26(a) may need to be altered to bear the brunt of the
elimination of interrogatories. This must be done carefully,
however, to avoid losing the benefits of interrogatories. In order
to abandon interrogatories altogether, the Committee should
amend Rule 26(a)(1) specifically to allow for the standard
exchange of certain lists between parties.
The elimination of Rule 33 interrogatories would, for
67 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring these disclosures unless a party objects during
the Rule 26(f) conference that initial disclosures are not appropriate in the circumstances
of the action and states the objection in the Rule 26(f) discovery plan). The Advisory
Committee Note to the 1993 Amendment further provides that: “Unless the court directs
a different time, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) are to be made at or within
10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). . . . As provided in the last
sentence of subdivision (a)(1), a party is not excused from the duty of disclosure merely
because its investigation is incomplete. The party should make its initial disclosures
based on the pleadings and the information then reasonably available to it.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(a) Advisory Comm. Note.
68 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. The result of this study, in part, encouraged
the Committee to amend Rule 26 to eliminate the opt-out provision. See also Kuo-Chang
Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial Device with No Effects, 21 PACE L. REV.
203, 237-39 (2000) (explaining major findings of the study).
69 HAYDOCK ET AL, supra note 1, at 363 (explaining how mandatory disclosures have
eliminated much of what interrogatories used to accomplish); see also Oliver, supra note
3, at 660 (describing how Kentucky’s use of initial disclosures “is intended to eliminate
the need for lengthy interrogatories”).
70 Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 136. Schutz and Schwiebert later explain
that while initial disclosures “do not eliminate the need for interrogatories directed
toward these issues,” Rule 26(a) does “allow for fewer and more focused interrogatories
about these broad categories.” Id.
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example, disallow a party from obtaining information regarding
all knowledgeable persons. As noted above, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)
requires a party automatically to disclose the identity of persons
likely to have information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings. However, “whether a disputed
fact is ‘alleged with particularity’ is not always clear. Should [an]
adversary conclude that [a] complaint alleges facts generally,
rather than with particularity,” she will not provide the names of
Therefore, unlike Rule 33
all important witnesses.71
interrogatories, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) does not ensure that an
adversary will be able to find out the names of all knowledgeable
persons. If Rule 33 interrogatories are eliminated, then the
Committee should alter Rule 26(a)(1)(A) to require the discovery
of any person who has knowledge of any particular discoverable
matter, regardless of whether the disputed fact is alleged with
particularity.
Also, the Committee should amend Rule 26(a) to require a
party to release a summary of technical or statistical data, if that
data is of central concern to the litigation, a disclosure for which
at present the Rule does not provide. This technical or statistical
data, set forth in list form, is essential because document
requests, such as those required by Rule 26(b)(1), cannot readily
reveal the needed information.72 The Rule as it stands is
inadequate for this proposition. Rule 26(a)(1)(B) requires the
disclosure of “a copy of, or a description by category and location
of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things that are
in the possession, custody, or control of the party and that the
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless
The disclosure of documents,
solely for impeachment.”73
although requiring the disclosure of data compilations,
significantly differs from the disclosure of technical and
statistical data.74
Lastly, the Committee should alter Rule 26(a) to preserve
the utility of contention interrogatories.
Contention

Berman, supra note 19, at 162-63.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
Technical and statistical data describes, for example, how many different types of
bottles a manufacturer produces and in what quantities consumers purchase these types
of bottles, rather than just showing invoices. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (allowing a
responding party to direct the propounding party to the primary business records, when
both parties could expend equal effort in crafting a list from the source documents). In
this view, then, Rule 33(d) does not differ greatly from Rule 26(a) as both now stand, and
therefore the Committee might not have to amend Rule 26(a) in this respect were it to
eliminate Rule 33.
71
72
73
74
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interrogatories protect parties by eliminating:
the potential prejudice or surprise to the party responding to the fraud
claim [for example] that might arise from the insertion at some point
in the litigation of unexpected and unpleaded allegations of
misrepresentations, and also saves the courts and litigants time spent
on litigating the adequacy of the . . . pleading of fraud and the . . .
attempt to replead the claim with the requisite particularity.75

At this time, however, it is unclear how to obtain the
invaluable information from contention interrogatories through
Rule 26(a) were Rule 33 eliminated. Conceived in theory, losing
the contention interrogatory is a major loss to a party who wants
to learn the meat behind their opponents’ pleadings. It should be
kept in mind, though, that the evasive interrogatory exchange as
it now exists rarely exchanges this information anyway; losing
the current system of contention interrogatories is not really
losing much.
2. Other Discovery Devices
Rule 26 is not the only rule that overlaps with much of what
is useful about today’s Rule 33.76 Increasing the use of requests
for admissions might do much of the work that interrogatories
could theoretically do, and make up for the resulting elimination
of Rule 33’s current breadth. Pretrial conferences provide for an
additional exchange of meaningful information, albeit at a time
further along in the case than when interrogatories would
normally be sent.
Requests for admissions are similar to interrogatories in that
both allow one party to discover more about how the adversary
plans to act at trial and how the adversary views its own case.
While the two methods seek the information in different ways —
asking for a list of previously unknown parties versus a
confirmation of suspected parties — the request for admission
mimics the best of what interrogatories have to offer a litigant
during early pretrial.77 Also, both interrogatories and admissions
75 David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application by the District Courts of
Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 921 n.100 (2003) (quoting
Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099-1100 (N.D. Iowa
2001)).
76 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (reporting that many practitioners
prefer to use document production requests and depositions instead of interrogatories to
obtain the same information).
77 Edna Selan Epstein, Rule 36: In Praise of Requests to Admit, in THE LITIGATION
MANUAL PRETRIAL 150-53 (John G. Koeltl & John Kiernan eds., 3d ed., 1999) (“[A]nswers
to interrogatories are rarely as useful as the responses that must be made to well-framed
requests to admit.”). But see Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Requests for Admissions, in PATENT
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may be served on parties only.
However, there is no limit in Rule 36 comparable to that in
Rule 33 as to how many requests for admission a party may file,
so an increased reliance on requests for admission might
resurrect some of the problems that the cap on the number of
interrogatories solved. Unlike interrogatories, though, courts in
complex litigation do not view successive sets of requests for
admission as burdensome or oppressive; admissions practice
presents different problems than does interrogatories practice.78
We also note that, “answers to interrogatories . . . are not
admissions, and a party can supplement or amend its answers”
to interrogatories, so parties answering admissions are more
careful to avoid traps.79
Pretrial conferences under Rule 16 and discovery conferences
under Rule 26(f) might also carry much of the weight that the
drafters of Rule 33 intended that Rule to cover. Both meetings
contemplate another set of disclosures, at different distances
from trial. Rule 26(f)’s encouragement of settlement discussions
might help replace what benefit contention interrogatories
brought to the parties under Rule 33. As for timing, parties most
often use interrogatories well in advance of trial, before the
deposition phase, and reserve the ability to propound more
interrogatories after objections or inadequate responses.80 This
proposed revision to the Federal Rules — eliminating Rule 33
interrogatories and adding certain provisions to Rule 26(a) —
would not therefore disrupt the timing of discovery exchange.
That is, requests for admissions may be made at any time, like
interrogatories; Rule 26(f) contemplates a conference early on in
discovery, and Rule 16 contemplates a conference very near to
trial. Because interrogatories are most often used early in
litigation, and then supplemented as needed later, these
alternate devices cover the span of time in which interrogatories
are useful. The robustness of the exchange of information at
Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) conferences, though, is a question for
LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 183, 188 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman
eds., 2000) (“[T]he request for admission is not the proper tool for discovering general
information about the position of the opposing party” but rather “is a basic tool that
allows the parties to narrow the issues of the case.”).
78 For a comparison of interrogatories and requests to admit related to this point, see
Epstein, supra note 77, at 150-51 (“The rules recognize the value of requests to admit by
not limiting their number.”).
79 See Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 146 (explaining parties’ use of
interrogatories and admissions as a tactical measure).
80 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 366 (advising parties “that interrogatories
are best used in the early stages of discovery” and explaining the timing of the various
discovery devices).
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further study.
3. Possible Objections to the Proposal
The expanded use of Rule 26 requests for admission and of
pretrial and discovery conferences might not replace all of the
work that interrogatories do or should do.
Requests for
admission, for example, require phrasing similar to that of a
cross-examination at trial;81 a request for admission requires that
the proponent “have some knowledge of the genuineness of the
matter requested.”82 Interrogatories, on the other hand, allow for
narrative answers, and do not require the sender to have certain
knowledge of the opponent.83
The requests for admission device does not perfectly replace
the interrogatory, at least not as the interrogatory is conceived in
theory. However, the request for admission device in practice
today serves the function the drafters intended interrogatories to
serve. Requests for admission are a less burdensome discovery
device and courts have had fewer problems with them than with
the interrogatory exchange. Because requests for admission do
most, though not all of what interrogatories were intended to
accomplish, and because interrogatories actually accomplish very
little, there is little risk in eliminating interrogatories. Consider
also the great expense that interrogatories mean for parties as
compared to their utility.
The expanded use of pretrial
conferences, considered here particularly for the conferences’
ability to narrow issues for trial, overlaps with much of what
interrogatories might have done, as conceived in Rule 33.
Finally, because interrogatories in practice exchange very little
substantive information, interrogatories are failing to live up to
their expectation and theoretical utility. If the device does not
work, if it costs a great deal, and if other discovery devices better
accomplish what interrogatories were intended to accomplish,
then there is little reason to maintain the device.

81 See Gonzalez, supra note 77, at 192 n.57 (“[M]any do not [even] view the request
for admission as a discovery tool . . . .” ).
82 Gonzalez, supra note 77, at 194 (adding that “the responding party is not
compelled to respond to ambiguous requests”).
83 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 369 (“The interrogatory, ‘State all facts upon
which you base your claim of failure to warn in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint,’ is
preferable to the request for admission, ‘You know of no facts upon which you base your
claim for failure to warn.’”) (quoting CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA
CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE 333 (1975)). Haydock and his co-authors assume, however,
that these hypothetical interrogatories will produce a responsive answer.

LURIA___CLABBY_FINAL SENT TO COPY

2005]

12/14/2005 5:12 PM

An Expense out of Control

49

IV. CONCLUSION
Any proposal for change to Rule 33 needs to be sensitive to
what, if anything, interrogatories can accomplish under the
current Rules, taking into account the contribution of initial
disclosures. While both of the above proposals would eliminate
the objections that automatically fly when parties exchange
interrogatories, neither can entirely replace interrogatories
because neither allows specific and searching questions as to the
other parties’ contentions. The Committee should consider
whether keeping the opportunity for parties to exchange
questions regarding contentions is worth the inefficiency and
expense of the interrogatory device, particularly when even
contention interrogatories rarely work as the sender intends
them to work. After all, as the discussion of the second proposal
above shows, existing discovery devices, including requests for
admissions, initial disclosures, and discovery and pretrial
conferences, can accomplish much of the positive work of
interrogatories, such as narrowing the issues that are to be tried.
In contrast, the first proposal shows great promise if the
Committee could draft uniform questions for certain areas of the
law. The proposal should also focus on contentions. The Rules
should combine both proposals, keeping the interrogatory device
only as far as it allows non-objectionable contention
interrogatories in certain areas of the law, and expanding initial
disclosures to address whom within the client’s reach is a person
most knowledgeable.

